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Abstract 
Safe operation of the LHC requires coherence across 
several systems: collimators and beam absorbers, beam 
dumping system, beam monitoring, beam interlocks etc. 
Collimators and beam absorbers must be correctly 
adjusted, during injection, when dumping the beam, but 
also when accelerating and during store. Failures are 
detected by beam loss monitors, by other beam 
instruments, by the quench protection and by hardware 
diagnostics. Beam dump requests are transmitted via the 
Beam Interlock System to the Beam Dumping System, 
and the beam is extracted into the beam dump block. The 
overall strategy of the LHC machine protection is 
discussed. The functionality of the systems with respect to 
machine protection is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For the LHC both the particle momentum and the 
beam intensity increases to unprecedented values (see 
Fig. 1). The high stored beam energy and the magnet 
energy must be safely discharged at the end of a fill or 
after a failure (Table 1). In this paper safe beam operation 
is discussed. Safe operation of the magnet system is 
presented elsewhere [1]. 
The proton momentum is a factor of seven above 
accelerators such as SPS, Tevatron and HERA, whereas 
the energy stored in the beams is more than a factor of 
100 higher. The transverse energy density as relevant 
factor for equipment damage is a factor of 1000 higher 
than for other accelerators. 
The complexity of the accelerator is unprecedented 
and repair of damaged equipment would take long, for 
example, the exchange of a superconducting magnet takes 
about 30 days.  
The first priority for the protection systems is to 
prevent equipment damage in the LHC ring and during 
the beam transfer from the pre-accelerator SPS to the 
LHC [2] [3]. Uncontrolled release of even a small fraction 
of the beam energy could cause serious damage to 
equipment. 
Table 1: Energy stored in magnets and beams 
Energy stored in magnet system 10 GJ 
Energy stored in one main dipole circuit 1.1 GJ 
Energy stored in one beam 360  MJ 
Average power, both beams ~10  kW 
Instantaneous beam power, both beams 7.8 TW 
Energy to heat and melt one kg copper 700 kJ 
Protection must be efficient from the moment of 
extraction from the SPS, throughout the LHC cycle. The 
beam intensity that could damage equipment depends on 
the impact parameters and on the equipment hit by the 
beam (Table 2). To evaluate the beam intensity to reach 
the damage level, a dedicated experiment was performed 
at the SPS [4] confirming the numbers previously 
assumed for the damage threshold at 450 GeV.  
The second priority is to protect superconducting 
magnets from quenching. At 7 TeV, superconducting 
magnets would quench in case of fast particle losses of 
10-8-10-7 of the nominal beam intensity (see Table 2). This 
value is orders of magnitude lower than for any other 
accelerator with superconducting magnets and requires a 
very efficient beam cleaning system [5]. 
2. PARTICLE LOSSES AND 
COLLIMATORS 
The LHC will be the first accelerator requiring 
collimators to define the mechanical aperture through the 
entire cycle. A sophisticated scheme for beam cleaning 
and protection with many collimators and beam absorbers 
has been designed [5] [6]. Some of the collimators must 
be positioned close to the beam (~6 σ). For luminosity 
operation at 7 TeV, the opening between two collimators 
jaws can be as small as 2.2 mm. 
Table 2: Bunch intensities, quench and damage levels 
(for protons) 
Intensity one “pilot” bunch 5·109 
Nominal bunch intensity   1.1·1011 
Nominal beam intensity, 2808 bunches 3·1014 
Nominal batch from SPS, 216/288 bunches 3·1013 
Damage level for fast losses at 450 GeV ~1-2·1012 
Damage level for fast losses at 7 TeV ~1-2·1010 
Quench level for fast losses at 450 GeV ~2-3·109 
Quench level for fast losses at 7 TeV ~1-2·106 
The expected beam lifetime is in the range of 10 h to 
100 h. The required beam cleaning efficiency depends on 
Fig. 1: Energy stored in the beam for LHC and other 
accelerators and energy stored in the LHC magnets 
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the lifetime (Table 3) [5]. The collimation system is 
designed to allow a drop of beam lifetime to about 0.2 h 
for a 10 s long transient. This corresponds to a power 
deposition of 500 kW. If the lifetime is lower, for 
example after equipment failure, the beams must be 
dumped immediately. Depending on the type of failure, 
the beams must be dumped very fast.  
For operation at injection energy, the requirements for 
cleaning efficiency are more relaxed (see Table 4). 







100 h 1 kW Healthy operation, cleaning must 
work and capture >99% of the 
protons 
10 h 10 kW Operation acceptable,  cleaning 
must work and capture >99.9% 
of the protons 
0.2 h 500 kW Operation only possibly for short 
time, collimators must be VERY 
efficient 
1 min 6 MW Equipment or operation failure – 
operation not possibly - beam 
must be dumped rapidly 
<<1min > 6 MW Beam must be dumped very fast 
3. TIME CONSTANTS FOR BEAM 
LOSSES 
Mechanisms for particle losses are classified according 
to the time constant for the loss [7]. 
For ultra fast beam losses, the beam is lost in a single 
turn or less. The mechanisms for ultra fast losses at 
injection are discussed in [8]. The requirements to avoid 
ultra fast losses when dumping the beam have been 
discussed in [9]. Protection of equipment is by passive 
systems such as collimators and beam absorbers. 
 Various mechanisms lead to a loss of circulating beam 
during many turns  (multiturn beam losses): 
• A few mechanism would cause particle losses in less 
than 5 ms. 
• Most failures would cause particle losses in more 
than 5 ms.   
• Steady losses are those during one second or more.  
4. FAILURES AND BEAM DUMP 
If particle losses during the operation with stored 
beam become unacceptable, or if there is an equipment 
failure, the beams must be extracted into a specially 
designed target (beam dump block) thus safely dissipating 
the energy. This requires the detection of an unsafe 
situation, either with beam instruments, or by hardware 
monitoring. A beam dump request is issued to one of the 
16 beam interlock controllers installed around the LHC. 
The beam interlock controller transmit this request to the 
Beam Dumping System (Fig. 2).  
The beam dump blocks are the only elements that can 
absorb the full LHC beam if correctly extracted without 
being damaged. Thus a safe extraction is also required at 
the end of a normal fill, for example when the luminosity 
is too low.  
The Beam Dumping System has a key role for 
protection. Before injection, it must be ready. One of the 
worst failure scenarios is injecting beam into the LHC 
with the Beam Dumping System not ready, since it could 
not dump the beams if required.  
A likely failure is the pre-firing of one beam dump 
kicker module or an unsynchronised beam dump. Part of 
the beam would be deflected by a wrong angle and not 
travel correctly through the 700 m long extraction 
channel. To protect the LHC aperture, a movable absorber 
in the dump insertion (TCDQ) captures bunches deflected 
by a small angle. The TCDQ must be set close to the 
beam (see Fig. 3), at injection and with squeezed beams 
to less than 10 σ (σ is the rms beam size). Since the 
position of the TCDQ is very critical it must be 
interlocked.  
Some 40 bunches would hit a fixed absorber in front 
of the septum magnet and the bulk of the beam travels to 
the beam dump block.  







100 h 65 W Healthy operation, beam cleaning 
not critical 
10 h 650 W Operation acceptable, cleaning 
should capture most  protons 
0.2  h 32 kW Operation acceptable, beam 
cleaning should capture 99.9% of 
protons 
0.1 h 64 kW Operation only possible for 10 s, 
beam cleaning must be very 
efficient 






Beam dump must be ready






signal to Beam Dump< 270 µs
Fig. 2: Active protection for operation with circulating 
beams. The beams are extracted into the beam dump 
block at the end of a fill or after a failure. 
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 5. FAILURES AND CONSEQUENCES 
When operating with circulating beams, many type of 
failures would lead to beam loss and require dumping the 
beams: 
• Magnetic field not as required (in the LHC there are 
about 10000 superconducting and normal conducting 
magnets) 
• Beam passage is blocked 
• RF problem 
• Operational parameter not as required 
• Beam instability 
Objects that could move into beam (beam monitors, 
movable experimental detectors, vacuum valves, etc.) are 
discussed in [10]. Another mechanism for losses is a bad 
beam vacuum.  
Other failures would not directly cause beam loss, but 
could lead to damage when beam is injected or dumped:   
• Collimators / Beam absorber / other objects not in the 
correct position (in particular for the TCDQ).  
• Closed orbit outside tolerance. Normally, this would 
be detected by orbit monitoring. Closed orbit offsets 
would reduce the cleaning efficiency when a 
superconducting magnet becomes primary or 
secondary aperture. 
• Beta beating outside tolerance  
• RF: too many particles leave buckets 
Such failures require corrective action. 
 
6. FAILURES IN THE MAGNET 
POWERING SYSTEM  
Failures in the magnet powering system are the most 
likely causes of beam losses: 
• Quench of superconducting magnets 
• Discharge of magnets with a resistance in the circuit 
(after a  quench, or by failure)  
• Trip of magnet power converter (most critical for 
normal conducting separation magnets– very fast 
orbit movement) 
• Transverse damper at injection in wrong phase 
Table 5 shows the time constants for an orbit 
movement after various type of failures in the magnet 
powering system. 
The most likely cause for beam loss at 7 TeV is a 
quench. A superconducting magnet could quench due to 
particle losses, due to a failure of the quench protection 
system or due to too high helium bath temperature. There 
could also be a spontaneous quench.  
The current decay in a main dipole magnet after a 
quench is approximately Gaussian with a time constant of 
200 ms. The orbit moves in 4.6 ms by 1 σ. The orbit 
movement from 2 σ to 3 σ takes only about 1.5 ms, and 
from 25 σ to 26 σ about 0.38 ms since the current decay 
accelerates. Eddy currents are not taken into account and 
could slow down the field decay.  
In [11] it was shown that for 7 TeV operation a failure 
of D1 dipole magnets is critical leading to a fast change of 
the closed orbit around the accelerator.  
At 450 GeV, power converter failures are expected to 
dominate. A power converter could switch off 
(exponential current decay, for example in case of water 
failure, etc.). After a failure of the power converter 
control, the power converter could ramp the current with 
maximum voltage resulting in a very fast orbit change. 
Even if such failure is not likely, the protection systems 
should prevent equipment damage. The time constants in 
Table 5 are pessimistic since they are derived from 
inductance and resistance in the circuit. Due to the energy 
stored in the power converter, the current decay will be 
slower [12]. 
Other failures are a wrong reference value for the 
current or an electric short in the coil of a normal 
conducting magnet (very critical for extraction septum 
magnets, less critical for injection septum magnets).   
 
7. BEAM LOSS MONITORS  
Since collimators define the aperture at about 6-9 σ (for 
injection, and for squeezed optics), particles will first be 
intercepted by collimator jaws. Beam loss monitors in the 
vicinity would detect the particle shower and request a 
beam dump when the signal rises above threshold 
(integration time of  40 µs). 
Other failures can only be detected locally, such as 
local orbit bumps. This cannot happen very fast (> some 
100 ms). Beam loss monitors around the ring would 
detect beam losses that are not detected by monitors at the 
aperture limitations [13]. After a failure, closed orbit 
deviations would rapidly increase everywhere around the 
ring. In addition, there could be a fast emittance growth 
and an explosion of the beam size. Consequences of 


















Fig. 3: Absorbers in the beam dumping insertion 
LHC Project Workshop - ’Chamonix XIV’
257
Table 5: Time constants for magnet current decay and orbit movement. The energy stored in the power converter is not 
considered, and the values for normal conducting magnets are pessimistic. 
dx/dt is the speed of the closed orbit movement, the time that the orbit moves by 1 σ is also given (for a quench the time 
to move from 2 σ to  3 σ is given since the movement accelerates). 
N a m e  o f th e  M a g n e t
N u m b e r o f 
c irc u its
n o m in a l 
ra m p P C  o ff
P C  ra m p  
m a x  U
T im e  fo r  
1σ P C  o ff
P C  ra m p  
m a x  U T im e  fo r 1  σ  
m m /m s m m /m s m m /m s m s m m /m s m m /m s m s
D 1  n o rm a lc o n d u c tin g  
s e p a ra tio n  IR 1  IR 5 2 0 .0 1 0 0 0 .0 9 0 0 2 .3 0 0 0 0 .6 0 .4 6 0 0 0 .7
D 3  D 4  n o rm a lc o n d u c tin g  
m a g n e ts  in  IR 3 2 0 .0 2 5 0 0 .1 1 0 0 3 .2 0 0 0 0 .4 0 .1 1 0 0 3 .0
D 3  D 4  n o rm a lc o n d u c tin g  
m a g n e ts  in  IR 7 2 0 .0 1 0 0 0 .0 6 0 0 2 .7 5 0 0 0 .5 0 .0 6 0 0 5 .3
M C B W H 8 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 2 2 2 0 .7 3 3 0 1 .7 0 .0 5 9 9 5 .3
M C B W V 8 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 2 1 0 0 .6 8 9 0 1 .8 0 .0 5 6 4 5 .6
Q u e n c h : T im e  
fo r  2  to  3  σ
M B  m a in  b e n d s 8 0 .0 0 9 6 1 3 0 .0 1 .5
D 1  s u p e rc o n d u c tin g  
s e p a ra tio n  IR 2  IR 8 4 0 .1 4 6 0 8 .6 1 .2
D 4  s u p e rc o n d u c tin g  
s e p a ra tio n  IR 4 2 0 .1 1 4 0 1 1 .0 0 .0 0 7 0 4 3 .0
M C B H /V 7 5 2 0 .0 0 1 9 0 .0 0 3 7 3 4 1 .2 0 .0 0 0 3 9 9 2 .0
M C B X V 2 4 0 .0 0 0 4 0 .0 0 9 2 1 3 6 .4 0 .0 0 2 9 1 1 0 .0
M C B X H 2 4 0 .0 0 1 3 0 .0 1 5 6 8 0 .2 0 .0 0 4 9 6 4 .6
M a x  d x /d t  a t  7  T e VM a x  d x /d t a t  4 5 0  G e V
 
 
8. MORE PROTECTION ? 
There are several reasons to not only rely on beam loss 
monitors to detect an unsafe situtation, but also on other 
instruments. The operation of BLMs could be more 
difficult than expected. At 450 GeV, the mechanical 
aperture is only slightly further outside from collimators 
that do not cover the complete phase space [5]). 
Collimators might not be in the correct position or might 
be damaged. During commissioning with low intensity 
beam, only part of the collimators will be close to the 
beam. It is wise to implement redundant systems to detect 
failures. 
Other instruments that will be used to issue beam dump 
requests (see [14] for  the beam instrument):  
• Signals from hardware diagnostics. For many 
failures, the beams can be dumped before loosing 
particles.  
• A complex quench protection system is required 
during magnet powering (see next section) and would 
dump the beam before the magnet field decays. 
• Beam position (change) monitors. 
• Fast beam current decay (“lifetime”) monitors. 
Recently, beam losses on the timescale of one ms due 
to failures of power converters became of concern for 
HERA [15]. Fast magnet current change monitors were 
developed and are now operational to dump the beam in 
time. A prototype for a similar system has been  
developed at CERN [16]. 
9. QUENCHES AND BEAM DUMP 
REQUEST 
After a quench, the energy stored in the quenched 
magnet is discharged into the coils by firing quench 
heaters. The energy stored in other magnets of the same 
electrical circuit is discharged into a resistor (energy 
extraction). Fig. 4 shows the time sequence: 
• The quench starts. It takes some time until the 
voltage across the magnet exceeds the threshold of 
the quench detector, plus 10 ms to validate the signal. 
• The quench heaters are fired and the voltage across 
the magnet coils increases. The current remains 
constant until the power diode in parallel to the 
magnet opens at about 6 V. 
• The quench detector actuates the energy extraction 
system by switching a resistor into the circuit. It 
takes between 5 to 7 ms to open the switch.  
• The quench detector sends a signal via the powering 
interlock system to the beam interlock system. It 
takes about 4 ms to complete the beam dump. In 
general, at this time the magnetic field is not yet 
affected by the quench.  
 
Fig.  4: Time sequence from the start of a quench to the 
current decay in the magnet, and to the completed beam 
dump 
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10. COMBINED FAILURES 
 It cannot be excluded that there are two or more 
failures at the same time. In general, if there is either an 
equipment or an operational failure AND at the same time 
a failure of the protection systems, the beam would still 
be dumped safely. Some examples are given. 
 It is assumed that the RF interlock system does not 
request a beam dump after a failure in the RF system. The 
beam debunches and protons start to fill the abort gap. 
When the beam is finally dumped, the particles in the 
abort gap would not be extracted correctly. Absorbers 
downstream of the beam dump kicker catch most particles 
(TCDQ).  
Only if 
• the RF trips 
• AND the RF beam dump request does not work 
• AND the TCDQ is not correctly positioned with 
respect to the orbit  
• AND there is a beam dump  
there could be damage. 
When an object moves towards the beam and the 
hardware interlock fails, the object starts to touch the 
beam halo. BLMs would detect particle losses. The beam 
current transformer would detect the beam current drop 
when the object moves further into the beam.  
A failure in the magnet powering system together with 
a failure of the beam loss monitors: the hardware 
interlock would detect the failure. The quench detection 
system would detect the failure (for superconducting 
magnets). For normal conducting magnets with a fast 
magnet current monitor the current change would be 
detected. For a failure of a dipole magnet, the beam 
position monitors would detect the orbit change. The 
beam current transformer would detect the beam current 
drop. 
However, there are combinations of failures that cannot 
be tolerated. If the beam becomes unstable 
• the Beam Interlock System must transmit the dump 
request to the Beam Dumping System 
• the energy tracking must work correctly 
• the kickers of the Beam Dumping System must fire 
Beam dumping system, energy tracking and Beam 
Interlock System are built with internal redundancy and 
must be failsafe. They are qualified with the Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL 1 … SIL 4,   SIL=4 highest 
reliability).  At least SIL 3 is required for these systems 
(for comparison: SIL 3 is required for the emergency 
breaking systems of the French TGV trains). The systems 
involved in active protection are based on failsafe 
hardware, and do not rely on computers with operating 
systems.   
The injection kicker magnets (or other kickers) must 
never fire with circulating beam above injection energy. 
Other kickers, for example for aperture exploration, 
should never fire with high intensity beam in the machine. 
Combined failures could occur after Mains 
Disturbances  (e.g. thunderstorm). In general, protection 
systems are connected to UPS and would still operate. If 
this would not work, the beam would still be dumped 
since the systems are failsafe.  
11. HARDWARE INTERFACES FOR 
MACHINE PROTECTION 
Fig. 5 shows the hardware links between the machine 
protection systems and other systems.  
A correct and reliable functioning of all those systems 
at the start of LHC operation is very challenging. To 
introduce some flexibility during the commissioning 
































































Fig. 5: Machine protection systems and hardware links. In red, systems for 
protection are shown and in blue other systems. Systems that have been 
recently proposed are in purple. 
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the conditions by introducing a “safe beam” flag 
permitting the masking of certain interlocks without 
compromising the safety. The safe beam flag is based on 
readings of the main dipole current (apprroximately 
proportional to the momentum)  and the beam intensities. 
12. QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED 
The cleaning system is defined and a detailed aperture 
model of the machine is available [6] for tracking studies. 
Various realistic failure scenarios with stored beams can 
be studied by particle tracking. Such simulations would 
help to show if the strategy for protection is adequate and 
help to define required settings for the protection systems. 
The beam intensity that could damage equipment at 
7 TeV or quench LHC magnets should be worked out to 
accurately set thresholds. 
Worst case scenarios for critical parts of the machine 
protection systems: what are the consequences if the 
system should fail? Such studies rely on competence in 
several domains and started with collaborators from 
GSI [17]. 
Controls system and machine protection: collimator 
and absorber controls, software interlocks, managing 
critical settings need to be addressed. 
13. CONCLUSIONS 
There is no single “Machine Protection System”: LHC 
Machine Protection relies on several systems working 
reliably together. 
Construction of the large systems for protection is 
progressing and smaller systems are in the design phase 
(for example, the generation and distribution of Safe LHC 
Parameters). 
Prototyping and first experience gained at SPS and 
elsewhere has been very valuable, for collimators, beam 
interlocks, beam loss monitors, orbit feedback, etc. 
In general, there is a large redundancy for the detection 
of failures, however: there is only ONE Beam Dumping 
System, only ONE Beam Interlock System and ONE 
Energy Tracking System. Reliability and availability of 
the machine due to the complex protection is an important 
issue – work is ongoing [18]. 
Safe operation of the LHC starts at the SPS, via 
extraction into TT40/TI8 and TI2, via the transfer lines, 
via LHC injection etc.  
Safe operation also relies on operational procedures for 
commissioning and operational. A “software interlock 
system” is required, managing critical settings, 
sequencing operational procedures and monitoring critical 
parameters. 
Safe operation does requires not only hardware and 
software interlocks, but also a culture:  
• as soon as the magnets are powered, there is the risk 
of damage due to the stored magnet energy 
• as soon as the beam intensity is above a certain value 
(…that is less than 0.01% of the full 7 TeV beam), 
there is the risk of beam induced damage 
A review on interlocks and machine protection is 
planned for April 2005, 11-13. 
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